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COMMENTS 
Protection of National Parks Through Buffer Zones: 
Does It Amount to a Fifth Amendment Constitutional 
Taking? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Increased degradation of national parks has caused many to ques-
tion the scope of the Secretary of the Interior's (Secretary) authority to 
protect national parks. In 1979 the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs requested that the National Park Service (NPS) pro-
duce a report on existing and threatening degradation of the National 
Park System. 1 That study, entitled State of the Parks - 1980,2 identi-
fied 4,345 specific threats to national parks. 3 Of these threats, over fifty 
percent originate from activities occurring outside national parks.4 
Though it can be asserted that the Secretary has an obligation to pro-
tect national parks from this degradation/; the Secretary's power is es-
sentially confined to activities occurring within national parks them-
selves. In the past, environmental groups have been the impetus in 
providing protection from outside threats. Now it appears as though 
1. Hiscock, Protecting National Park System Buffer Zones: f.'xisting, Proposed, and Sug-
gested Authority, 7 J. ENERGY L. & PoL'Y 35, 41 (1986) [hereinafter Protecting National 
Parks]. 
2. NATIONAL PARK St:RVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATE OF THE PARKS- 1980, 
A REPORT To THF CoNGRt:ss (1980). 
3. !d. at 5. The Parks Report not only listed specific threats to national parks, but it also 
listed proposed development projects which are considered to be threatening to the environment. 
Specific threats to parks include: at Bandelier, Olympic and other parks, increased numbers of 
campers and backpackers are damaging the wilderness character; at Big Bend and Organ Pipe, 
cactus collectors are poaching such large quantities of plants that the natural scene is being 
changed; at Chattahoochee river, raw sewage and chemical runoff is seriously impacting the water 
quality in the area; at Badlands, fossil collecting has become common place; and at Cape Lookout, 
off-road vehicles have become a major impact on the resources located there. 
Some of the specific development projects which threaten the national parks include: at North 
Cascades the planned Dam Construction on Copper Creek will impact many unique environmen-
tal qualities; at Glacier National Park an open-pit eoal mine will impact the national park; at 
Chaco Canyon oil, gas, coal and uranium developments are impacting the canyon; at the edge of 
Yell ow stone and Grand Teton National Parks proposed geothermal development will threaten 
both parks; at Indiana Dunes, industrial plants and nuclear plant construction pose a threat to 
natural and cultural resources. /d. at 20-23. 
4. /d. at viii. 
5. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 91 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
71 
72 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
Congress is taking a more active role by providing the Secretary with 
powers which arguably extend beyond the boundaries of national 
parks.6 The purpose of this comment is to address the Secretary's au-
thority to protect national parks from external threats, and to consider 
whether the execution of this authority constitutes a fifth amendment 
taking. The specific topics to be addressed are: 1) an overview of na-
tional park protection; 2) a background of the constitutional and com-
mon law powers given to the Secretary; 3) legislative enactments which 
have increased the Secretary's duties over national parks and park pe-
ripheries; and 4) whether creating buffer zones is considered a fifth 
amendment taking. Necessarily, this comment will begin with a de-
tailed discussion of the powers given the Secretary to protect national 
parks. The first section will be dedicated to this end. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Since most national parks were originally created in remote areas, 
there was little concern about establishing a buffer zone7 to protect 
them against exterior threats.8 In fact, during its genesis years, the 
NPS actively sought to attract visitors to national parks, and strived to 
provide comfortable accommodations for them.9 This was in accord 
with the original mandates given the NPS by the National Park Service 
Organic Act (Organic Act). 10 
Concurrent with the obligation to manage national parks for the 
enjoyment of the public, the Organic Act also requires that a present 
use "will leave them [national parks] unimpaired for the enjoyment of 
future generations."11 Arguably, the Organic Act imposes contradictory 
mandates. On the one hand, the NPS is to manage national parks for 
public enjoyment; on the other, national parks are to be protected for 
future generations. As a result of this conflict, many national parks 
6. See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text. 
7. A buffer zone is a "[t]erm used in land-use law to describe an area separating two differ-
ent types of zones or classes of areas to make each one blend more easily with another." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 176 (5th ed. 1979). A buffer zone in this context is a strip of land established 
to protect national parks from any land use which is considered incompatible. 
B. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks And The Regulation of Private Lands, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976) [hereinafter Helpless Giants]. 
9. Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks From the External Threat Dilemma, 20 LAND 
& WATER L. REv. 355, 358 (1985) [hereinafter External Threat Dilemma]; R. NASH, WILDER-
NESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 325-26 (3d ed. 1982). 
10. !6 u.s.c. §§ 1-3 (1982). 
11. 16 l.J .S.C. § 1 states that national parks were created "to conserve the scenery and the 
natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same 
in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future 
generations." 
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have become nothing more than extensions of urbandom coupled with a 
scenic view. 12 
As the use of national parks increased/3 the Secretary found the 
Organic Act inadequate to protect national parks from mounting degra-
dation. The necessary protection still seemed to be lacking. As one of 
the possible responses to this problem, Congress has considered creating 
buffer zones next to national parks. Though some question whether 
buffer zone regulations are necessary / 4 others believe that the Secretary 
currently has inadequate constitutional, common law or statutory au-
thority to protect national parks. As will be shown by the next section, 
the scope of the Secretary's authority is still substantially undefined. 
III. CoNSTITUTIONAL AND CoMMON LAw PROTECTION PowERS 
The Secretary's power to protect national parks originates in the 
Constitution. 111 This authority, most often found within the ambit of the 
property clause, 16 has been the primary source of national park protec-
tion. Also, there are two other constitutional, and two common law doc-
trines which have provided protection to national parks. Combined, 
these five doctrines include: 1) the public trust doctrine; 2) the law of 
nuisance; 3) the property clause; 4) the commerce clause; and 5) the 
supremacy clause. 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine requires the Secretary to act as trustee in 
maintaining public lands in trust for the people of the United States. 
Protection of public lands through this doctrine was recognized long 
before the passage of the 1916 Organic Act. 17 In Knight v. United 
12. j. SAX, MoUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980). Tourism in the parks today is often 
little more than an extension of the city. Urbandom in national parks manifests itself through 
traffic jams, long lines, restaurants, and the unending drone of motors. /d. at 12. 
13. Recreation is so intense that there is now a 1 0-year waiting list to he able to float the 
Colorado River in a private raft. Battle over the Wilderness, Nt:WSWEEK, July 25, 1983 at 22 
[hereinafter Battle over the Wilderness]. In essence, society is "loving our parks to death." Protect-
ing National Parks, supra note 1, at 40. 
14. Buffer zones are not always created through regulations. Buffer zones can be created by 
land agreements between government and private land owners. 
15. Since the power to create national parks is derived from the property and cession clauses 
under the Constitution, the authority to protect national parks is likewise found in the Constitu-
tion. National park protection is mainly based in the property clause, but the supremacy clause 
and the commerce clause are also doctrines which are available. 
16. The property clause provides: "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United 
States." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1-3 (1982). 
74 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
Land Association18 the Supreme Court stated "the Secretary is the 
guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands."19 
This trustee requirement was reinforced in Camfield v. United 
States,20 when the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government 
"would be recreant to its duties as trustee for the people of the United 
States to permit any individual or private corporation to monopolize 
[public lands] for private gain .... " 21 Based on this, the Secretary 
has a trusteeship to protect all federal public lands,22 but query if this 
includes national parks? 
In Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 23 the court held that 
the Secretary in fact had a duty of trusteeship regarding national 
parks. 24 The court held that the Organic Ace11 and the Redwood Na-
tional Park Act26 required that the Secretary act as trustee to protect 
the Redwood National Park.27 Although the public trust doctrine was 
applauded by many, its current status is less noteworthy. In Sierra 
Club v. Andrus28 the court rejected the public trust doctrine finding 
that "trust duties [are] distinguishable from statutory duties."29 In An-
drus, the court stated that amendment la-a of the Organic Act made a 
clear distinction between trust responsibilities and statutory responsibil-
18. 142 u.s. 161 (1891). 
19. Id. at 181. 
20. 167 U.S. 518 (1897). 
21. In Camfield, a land owner had constructed fences on private lands which effectively en-
closed over twenty thousand acres of federal public lands. The Supreme Court upheld a congres-
sional act which prohibited such enclosures of federal lands. Id. at 524. 
22. The pubic trust doctrine was reinforced subsequent to Knight and Camfield in Utah 
Power & Light v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (lOth Cir. 
1972). See also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: tffective judicial 
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
23. 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The court, in the following year (Redwood II) looked 
at the evidence and found that the logging occurring on the periphery was in fact threatening the 
periphery of the Redwood National Park. Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 
284 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The studies that were conducted by the NPS recommended that the periph-
eral lands be obtained to create a buffer zone. In the alternative, it was suggested, that cooperative 
agreements be entered into which would limit the amount of logging done near the park. 
24. 376 F. Supp. at 95-96. This was the first successful attempt by environmentalists to 
obtain limited protection outside the actual boundaries of national parks. See Hudson, Sierra Club 
v. Dept. of the Interior: The Fight to Preserve Redwood National Park, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 781, 
815 (1978). 
25. 16 U.S.C. § I (1970). 
26. The court relied on 16 U.S. C. §§ 79a, 79b(a), 79c(d), 79c(e) ( 1970). Specifically 16 
U.S.C. § 79a requires that the Secretary "preserve significant examples of the primeval coastal 
redwood forests and the streams and seashores with which they are associated for purposes of 
public inspiration, enjoyment, and scientific study." 376 F. Supp. at 93. 
27. The court not only relied on the duty imposed by the public trust doctrine, but the court 
also recognized a statutorily imposed obligation. Id. at 96. 
28. 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980). 
29. Id. at 449. 
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ttles, and that any mingling of the two was unfounded. 30 The public 
trust doctrine was rejected because "the court viewed the statutory du-
ties previously discussed as comprising all the responsibilities which 
defendants must faithfully discharge."31 Consequently, the authority 
under the public trust doctrine was considered to be included in the 
statutory obligation of the Organic Act. Even though the public trust 
doctrine was affirmed as valid by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals32 
shortly after Andrus, most authorities recognized Andrus as putting an 
end to the public trust doctrine. 33 It now appears as though the Secre-
tary can only invoke trustee powers when specifically authorized by 
statutory enactments. 
B. The Law of Nuisance 
The Second Restatement of Torts defines a public nuisance as "an 
unreasonable interference with a right to the general public."34 While 
the common scenario of nuisance law is that of one neighbor bringing 
suit against another neighbor,311 the government can also bring nuisance 
suits against private parties.36 In United States v. Luce,31 the federal 
government brought suit against a fish factory because of the "offensive 
odors" being emitted.38 In granting injunctive relief, the court held that 
the government had a right to restrain a nuisance when no adequate 
remedy at law existed. 
In the formative years of federal nuisance law, the courts strived to 
achieve three major objectives through the doctrine.39 These objectives 
were: 1) preserving the balance of power between the Supreme Court 
30. Though the public trust doctrine was severely limited in its scope, the court in Andrus 
stated that "the Secretary has an absolute duty, which is not to be compromised . . . to take 
whatever actions and seek whatever relief as will safeguard the units of the National Park Sys-
tem." (quoting Senate Report 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (October 21, 1977)). /d. at 448. 
Therefore the court was taking with one hand and giving back with the other. The Secretary lost 
the power to regulate non-federal lands under the public trust doctrine, but the court gave that 
same power back under the guise of a statutory obligation. 
31. /d. at 449 (emphasis by the court). 
32. United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980). 
33. Protecting National Parks, supra note 1, at 49. 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 8218 (1979). 
35. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private nuisance as "a nontrespassory inva-
sion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." Id. § 8210. 
36. Government brings suit under the doctrine of public nuisance rather than private nui-
sance. /d. § 821 B. See Comment, Protecting National Parks From Development Beyond Their 
Borders, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (1984) [hereinafter Development Beyond Their 
Borders]. 
37. 141 F. 385 (C.C.D. Del. 1905). 
38. /d. at 390. 
39. See Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal Common Law of 
Water Pollution, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 627, 633 [hereinafter Federal Common Law]. 
76 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
and state governments;40 2) providing a forum for the resolution of in-
terstate disputes;41 and 3) developing a means for states to protect envi-
ronmental integrity.42 Of these, the main concern was the balance of 
power between the Supreme Court and state governments. 43 
While federal nuisance law provided one method of curtailing pri-
vate activities from occurring next to public lands, federal nuisance law 
was severely limited by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."" In Erie, the 
Court held there was no federal general common law.45 The Court 
held that the incorrect application of the Rules of Decisions Act46 had 
resulted in an unconstitutional invasion of the states' authority. 47 As a 
result, the doctrine of common law nuisance was severely curtailed, al-
though not completely abrogated.48 
After Erie, the doctrine of federal nuisance was not invoked again 
for over thirty years.49 Not until Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 50 was 
the doctrine of common law nuisance once again applied. 51 In Milwau-
kee, the Supreme Court revived the federal common law doctrine of 
nuisance by stating "[i]t may happen that new federal laws and new 
federal regulations may in time preempt the field of common law nui-
sance."52 The implication of this is that until new federal laws and 
federal regulations preempt the field, common law nuisance is still a 
40. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84-85 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-
21 (1906). 
41. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 
46, 84-85 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906). 
42. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907). 
43. Federal Common Law, supra note 39, at 627-28. 
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938). 
45. Up until this time, Federal non-statutory law had been used: in settling disputes between 
states; in disputes involving federal questions; in adjudicating cases to which the United States was 
a party; and in cases when the United States exercised its territorial jurisdiction over territories 
and federal enclaves. But Erie is purported to have "kill[ed] the federal general common law." 
Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines Of State Law In The Federal Courts, 40 CoRNELL L.Q. 
561, 574 (1955). 
46. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. XX, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
47. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
48. One reason the doctrine of common law nuisance was not completely abrogated was that 
individual states could still invoke the public nuisance doctrine. What essentially was abrogated 
was federal common law nuisance. Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Nuisance-
State Ecological Rights A rising Under Federal Common Law, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 597, 602. 
49. Between 1938 and 1972 there were virtually no federal nuisance cases decided. See infra 
notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
50. 406 u.s 91 (1972). 
51. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee is considered to be the first case which applied the doctrine 
of federal nuisance law anew. See generally United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 
672 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on other grounds yet requiring a modification of the in;unction, 498 
F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & 
Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972). 
52. 406 U.S. at 107. 
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viable doctrine. Though most cases since Milwaukee have involved the 
protection of air03 and water04 quality, some nuisance cases have been 
asserted upon other grounds. 00 Because most air and water quality is 
now controlled by federal statute,06 it appears as though the doctrine of 
nuisance has reverted back to a position of less prominence.67 It should 
be noted, however, that the doctrine of public nuisance could still serve 
the NPS as a viable means of obtaining national park protection.08 
C. The Property Clause 
Under the property clause,09 Congress has been given broad pow-
ers to protect federal lands by creating "needful rules and regula-
tions."60 In essence, Congress has police powers within states to deter-
mine how federal lands will be used and protected.61 In United States 
53. United States v Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Mont. 1979) (injunction 
ordering fluoride emission levels to be reduced). 
54. United States ex rei. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 
197:\) (restraining steel producer from discharging waste into Lake Michigan); United States v. 
Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on other grounds yet requiring a 
modification of the injunction, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (injunction against dredging, filing 
and construction in a navigable waterway in New Jersey); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972) (ordering greater precautions be taken to avoid oil spillage 
on Lake Champlain). 
55. In United States v. Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137, 141-143 (E.D. Va. 1979), it 
was asserted that a 300-foot office building would be a visual intrusion on the monumental core of 
Washington, D.C. Although the invocation of the doctrine of nuisance was denied, the court con-
cluded that the Attorney General had standing to instigate the litigation, and to attempt to protect 
the rights and properties of the United States. The court also held that the Secretary had a right to 
sue in order to protect national parks, memorials, and monuments. See also 12 ENV'T REP. CAS. 
1817, 1819 (E.D. Va. 1979); Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1194 n.33. 
56. With the passage of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, common law nuisance 
may be preempted. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 
1, 22 (1981 ), states: ·'the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely 
preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA [Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act] which was completely revised after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee." See also United 
States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N .J. 1982) (holding that certain provisions of the 
Clean Air Act had preempted federal common law). 
57. "The limited usefulness of the nuisance doctrine in preserving the national parks may 
therefore be more the result of failure to assert it than of any inherent shortcomings in the doc-
trine." Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1197. See also Note, Aesthetic 
Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rt:v. 1075 (1970). 
58. It must be remembered that the "nuisance exception . . is not coterminous with the 
police power itself, (citation omitted) but is a narrow exception allowing the government to pre-
vent 'a misuse or illegal use.' " Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1236, 
1256 (1987). 
59. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, d. 2. See supra note 16. 
60. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
61. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 
243 U.S. 389 (1916); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911 ); United States v. Lindsey, 595 
F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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v. Alford,62 Justice Holmes, in reference to the property clause, stated: 
"Congress may prohibit the doing of acts . . . that imperil the publicly 
owned forests."63 Though this might be viewed as an expansive reading 
of the property clause, it is not inconsistent with previous Supreme 
Court decisions.64 This reading of the property clause was recently re-
affirmed in Kleppe v. New Mexico. 611 In Kleppe, the Supreme Court 
stated: "Camfield66 contains no suggestion of any limitation on Con-
gress' power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that 
the power granted by the property clause is broad enough to reach be-
yond territoriallimits."67 Kleppe thus indicates that the property clause 
is now read so broadly that Congress' authority under the clause can be 
considered to be "without limitations. " 68 Though Congress has been 
given expansive powers under the property clause, Kleppe expressly 
reserved judgment on the extent to which Congress may regulate activi-
ties on neighboring non-federal lands.69 Consequently, the scope of 
power Congress has given to the Secretary is likewise uncertain. Since 
only a limited number of cases have held that Congress has any regula-
tory authority over non-federal lands,70 the scope of authority delegated 
to the Secretary is yet to be defined. 
62. 274 U.S. 264 (1927). 
63. ld. at 267. 
64. In Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), the Court said: 
While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate 
against nuisances within a State which it would have within a Territory, we do not 
think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for 
the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is 
ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its 
own protection. A different rule would place the public domain of the United States 
completely at the mercy of state legislation. 
ld. at 525-26. 
65. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
66. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897). See supra note 64. 
67. 426 U.S. at 538. 
68. Shepard, The Scope Of Congress' Constitutional Power Under The Property Clause: 
Regulating Non-Federal Property To Further The Purposes Of National Parks And Wilderness 
Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 491 & n.86 (1984) [hereinafter The Property Clause]. 
See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. Mc-
Cracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United 
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 
(1940); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1914); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840). 
69. Here the Court stated: 
While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on 
private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. Untied States, 167 U.S. 
518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate ... to determine the extent, if any, to 
which the Property Clause empowers Congress. 
426 U.S. at 546. 
70. See United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 
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In the past, the property clause has been one of the strongest doc-
trines which the Secretary has relied upon to provide protection to na-
tional parks. Yet, the unresolved question of whether the property 
clause can be read broadly enough to regulate non-federal land for pur-
poses of protecting national parks is still raging. Though the answer 
appears to be in the negative,71 there is some authority to the 
contrary. 72 
D. The Commerce Clause 
Even though the protection of national parks is based on the prop-
erty clause, the commerce clause'3 is also a constitutional power which 
Congress can use to regulate threatening activities occurring next to 
national parks. With national parks encompassing over one hundred 
million acres74 and generating billions of dollars annually,711 the nexus 
between national parks and the commerce clause is reflected by the 
commerce involved.76 Although the commerce clause has had limited 
518 (1897) 
71. Besides the Supreme Court expressly reserving judgment regarding the scope of the prop-
erty clause in Kleppe, there are other concerns why the property clause should not be read too 
broadly. One such concern is the relationship between the federal government and individual 
states. "Every expansion of the property clause increases the power of the federal government at 
the expense of the states' authority, and by the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that is cause 
for unease." Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 254. 
72. Since Kleppe, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down two attacks which 
challenged regulations controlling activities occurring on non-federal lands. In United States v. 
Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), the court upheld a 
conviction for duck hunting within Voyageur National Park even though duck hunting was per-
mitted under state law. Here the court specifically held that both Kleppe and Camfield authorized 
this use of the property clause. Similarly, in Minnesota ex rei. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 
(8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), the court upheld a federal statute which 
restricted motorized travel on non-federal lands and waters, located within Boundary Waters Ca-
noe Area. Here the court reasoned that the regulation of conduct on or off the public land was 
necessary to protect the area from activities which "would threaten the designated purpose of 
federal lands." 660 F.2d at 1249. 
73. The commerce clause grants power to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3. 
74. "Over the last six decades, our system of national parks has expanded to include well 
over three hundred areas encompassing over one hundred million acres of land." Development 
Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1190. 
7 5. It has been projected that tourism in Yellowstone National Park injects approximately 
610 million dollars annually into Wyoming's economy. Comment, State Participation in Federal 
Policy Making for the Yellowstone Ecosystem: A Meaningful Solution or Business as Usual?, 21 
LAND AND WATER L. REV. 397, 400 (1986) [hereinafter Yellowstone Ecosystem]. 
76. In United States v. 967.905 Acres of Land, 305 F. Supp. 83 (D. Minn. 1969), rev'd, 447 
F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972), the District Court described the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area located in Minnesota as "attract[ ing] Boy Scouts, campers, 
sportsmen, lzaak Walton League members and others from the entire United States and Canada, 
usually for several-day to several-week canoe trips, fishing, outings, etc." 305 F. Supp. at 85. The 
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use in upholding environmental decisions,77 Congress does have exten-
sive authority under the clause if desired.78 The commerce clause is 
essentially a dormant consitutional power which could be invoked by 
Congress to increase the Secretary's power to protect national parks. As 
park use increases, the commerce clause may become more of a pre-
dominant doctrine. 
E. The Supremacy Clause 
The supremacy clause79 can also provide protection to national 
parks by preempting any inconsistent or conflicting state law which 
would reduce the effectiveness of any protective federal statutes.80 As 
early as 1824, the Supreme Court recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden, 81 
that federal law and state law might conflict.82 There, the Supreme 
Court ruled that state law must yield to federal law whenever a conflict 
arises. 83 
Though the supremacy clause is rarely invoked in the protection of 
national parks,84 the constitutional power is available if state and fed-
eral laws conflict. This is important to the current discussion because if 
income into Minnesota because of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area would certainly meet any 
constitutional challenges regarding interstate commerce. 
77. See, United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); Leslie 
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). 
78. The strength of the power given Congress can be seen by the number of cases upheld by 
the Supreme Court under the commerce clause. "With a single distinct exception,[National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)] the Supreme Court has not struck down a con-
gressional exercise of power under that clause [the commerce clause] for four decades." Helpless 
Giants, supra note 8, at 256. See generally, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. 
Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
79. The supremacy clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
80. Utah Power & Light v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404-05 (1916); United States v. 
Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
81. 22 U.S. (Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
82. !d. at 211. 
83. !d. It should also be noted that rules created by federal agencies have preemptive rights 
over state legislation. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 
(1959). See generally Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963). 
84. The reason the supremacy clause is rarely invoked is because it has only been in the last 
few years that states have begun passing state environmental protection statutes which could con-
flict with federal statutes. Yellowstone Ecosystem, supra note 75, at 402-03. 
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buffer zones were created by Congress to protect national parks, the 
supremacy clause could be invoked to defeat conflicting state law. 
Whenever state law permitted environmentally threatening activities to 
harm the national parks, the supremacy clause would preempt the of-
fending activity. 
F. Summary of Constitutional and Common Law Protective Powers 
Constitutional and common law doctrines can and have provided 
protection for national parks. These doctrines, however, are not invoked 
as often as they could be because more specific legislative enactments 
are now taking a superior position.811 These legislative enactments do 
not necessarily abrogate the constitutional and common law doctrines, 
but rather, these statutes provide more specific guidelines by which the 
Secretary must protect the national parks. 
While legislative enactments do not resolve all the problems facing 
national parks, congressional enactments do provide specific authority 
through additional national park protection. The next section will focus 
on some recent legislative enactments specifically, those which effect the 
Secretary's power to protect national parks. 
IV. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS 
Legislative enactments such as the National Environment Policy 
Act86 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act87 have in-
creasingly provided more protection for national parks. For ease of dis-
cussion, these legislative enactments can easily be divided into three 
major categories: 1) legislation which requires proper planning and ad-
ministration of the NPS; 2) legislation which protects the resources lo-
cated within national parks; and 3) legislation which permits, yet con-
trols, the development of resources located in or near national parks. 
A. Planning and Administration 
Under the planning and administration category, some of the ma-
JOr congressional enactments include: the National Park Service Or-
ganic Act, and its amendments;88 the National Environment Policy 
85. E.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. 1984). 
87. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
88. The National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 gave the NPS the responsibility of pro-
tecting national parks from any degradation which would impair the land for future generations. 
16 U.S.C. § 1-20 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The Organic Act requires the NPS to "regulate the use of 
the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments ... as conform to the fundamental pur-
pose of the said park . . which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
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Act;89 the Federal Land Policy and Management Act;90 and the Na-
tional Forest Management Act.91 These statutes provide for an exten-
sive networking of national park land management. The purpose be-
hind these administrative statutes is to furnish a structured procedure 
through which governmental agencies can make environmentally sound 
decisions while providing for public input. Though these statutes often 
overlap in their mandates, they represent the most comprehensive envi-
ronmental planning statutes ever enacted. 
Perhaps the most far reaching managerial enactment is the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires Environ-
mental Impact Statements to be made whenever a major action "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of human environment" is proposed.92 This 
provides the NPS the opportunity to carefully review all proposed de-
velopment on federal lands to determine whether such development is 
environmentally sound. The passage of NEPA empowered the NPS 
with the authority to regulate all land uses on federal public lands. 
objects." 16 U.S.C. § 1. These charges were strengthened by the 1978 amendments in which 
Congress reaffirmed its previous mandates while expanding its scope to include all land and water 
found within national parks. 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (Supp. 1984). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1c (1974). 
89. The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 was one of Congress' first at-
tempts in recent years to provide protection for national parks. NEPA is probably the most com-
prehensive environmental planning statute ever enacted. This Act creates a procedure by which 
federal agencies can make environmentally sound decisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & 
Supp. 1984). The Act requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be prepared every 
time a major action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" is proposed. 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(c). If an EIS is required, then the agency responsible must first submit a "draft 
environmental impact statement" (DEIS), whereby the public and interested parties have an op-
portunity to respond to the proposed activity. After the DEIS is completed, a final EIS is prepared 
and submitted. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502-03 (1984). NEPA also requires federal agencies to consult with 
other federal agencies on the environmental ramifications of any proposed projects. 42 U.S. C. § 
4332(2)(C). 
90. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 was comprehensive 
legislation which requires extensive land management. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982 & Supp. 
1985). In this sense it differs from NEPA because NEPA was designed specifically to manage the 
environment. FLPMA has management directives which mandate the Secretary to protect park 
resources in a manner that will protect the "quality of scientific, historical, ecological, environmen-
tal, air and atmosphere, water resource and archeological values." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). 
FLPMA also arguably requires the protection of public lands which are areas of "critical envi-
ronmental concern" even if they are out side the national parks. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1711(a). 
91. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 was enacted to modify the prior 
Forest and Rangeland Resources Planning Act. NFMA requires a program to protect, manage 
and develop the natural forest system. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1982 & Supp. 1985). Though 
NFMA was mainly enacted for the development of renewable resource programs, it also requires 
the Secretary to "protect and, where appropriate, improve the quality of soil, water and air re-
sources." 16 U.S.C. § 1602(S)(c). This protection encompasses, among other things, the protection 
of the silverculture, forest resources, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish. 16 U.S.C. § 
1604(g)(3)(A). 
92. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982). 
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NEPA also provides limited power to protect national parks from deg-
radation occurring beyond federal public lands. 
B. Protection of Resources 
Legislation which protects resources located within national parks 
includes: the Wilderness Act;93 the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act;94 the Endangered Species Act;95 the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act;96 and the Clean Air97 and Clean Water Acts.98 
93. The Wilderness Act of 1964 provides for the creation and management of wilderness 
areas. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1982 & Supp. 1985). A wilderness area is defined as "an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a 
visitor who does not remain." 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). In conjunction with the enactment of the 
Wilderness Act, the Forest Service designated 54 areas as wilderness areas. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) 
(1985). The Wilderness Act also required the Forest Service to study an additional 5.4 million 
acres which were designated as "primitive areas" to determine their suitability for wilderness 
designation. This study was to be completed within I 0 years and then submitted to the President 
for final approval. 16 U.S.C § 1132(b). The Forest Service has also attempted to designate addi-
tional wilderness areas through the Forest Service's Roadless Area Review and Evaluation 
(RARE I,II), though not specifically mandated to do so. See generally, Rickart, Wilderness Land 
Preservation: The Uneasy Reconciliation Of Multiple And Simple Use Land Management Poli-
cies, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 873, 886-909 (1980). 
94. The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, commonly known as 
the National Wildlife Refuge System, created a program for providing protection for various types 
of wildlife. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1982 & Supp. 1985). This is one of the few statutes which 
manages land for the conservation of wildlife. Though the Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides 
protection for the habitat in which the species lives, ESA is not as all encompassing as the N a-
tiona! Wildlife Refuge System. In order for ESA to provide protection to the surrounding lands, it 
must be determined that a species is in fact listed as an animal or plant which is protectable. By 
contrast, the National Wildlife Refuge System provides protection to the natural habitat of all 
animals regardless of whether they have been designated as endangered. The N a tiona! Wildlife 
Refuge System has as its directives, a mandate to exclude all uses incompatible with the protection 
of wildlife. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(l). As the courts have stated "all national wildlife refuges are 
maintained for the primary purpose of preserving, protecting and enhancing wildlife and other 
natural resources and of developing a national program of wildlife and ecological conservation 
and rehabilitation." Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, II ENv'T REP. CAs. 2098, 2099 (D.D.C. 
1978) (emphasis by the court). See generally Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 
(D.D.C. 1978). 
95. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 was passed to protect endangered and 
threatened species and their critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982 & Supp. 1985). ESA 
requires the Secretary to identify and designate species of wildlife, fish and plants that are endan-
gered or threatened and to designate areas of critical habitat for the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). 
ESA also prohibits people from taking endangered wildlife or plants from the natural areas in 
which they are found. To "take," as defined by ESA, means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 
1532(19). Therefore, ESA is a powerful mandate in the protection of resources that are endan-
gered in any way. The Secretary is also required to protect the critical habitat which arguably 
extend beyond the boundary of national parks. 
96. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1982 & Supp. 1985), 
protects rivers with "outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational, geological, fish and wildlife, 
historic, cultural, or other similar values ... for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future 
generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1271. This Act not only contains provisions that require the protection 
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These six statutes are representative of the regulations which Congress 
has drafted to protect both national wildlife (and the habitat) and scen-
ery through out national parks. These comprehensive statutes are more 
extensive in their periphery protection than either the administrative 
statutes, or the statutes which allow for development of resources. The 
reason these statutes provide more protection to national parks is be-
cause the protection of wildlife and natural resources necessarily re-
quires that the habitat and/or scenic setting in which the objects are 
located also be protected. This provides more protection because the 
NPS can restrict land owners from continuing activities adjacent to the 
parks which are detrimental to the purpose for which the parks were 
created.99 
For example, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides that up to 
320 acres on each side of a scenic river can be dedicated as a protect-
able area. Likewise, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the 
Secretary to protect the "critical habitat" of any species of plant or 
animal which is endangered or threatened. As interpreted, ESA has 
been applied very strictly no matter what the cost. 100 Because of the 
of rivers, but it also specifically provides for the protection of the lands surrounding the rivers. 
The Act provides that "particular attention shall be given to scheduled timber harvesting, road 
construction, and similar activities" and to provide "safeguards against pollution of the river in-
volved[,] and unnecessary impairment of scenery within the component in question." 16 U.S.C. §§ 
1280(a), 1283(a). Section 1274(b) also states that not more that 320 acres on each side of the river 
should be designated as included within the zone of protection. Therefore, any area less than 320 
acres is considered appropriate for protection, even if the zone encroaches onto private lands. 
97. The Clean Air Act of 1982 protects our national parks by preserving the sight or vista 
which is so important. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857L (1982). The purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to 
preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality in national parks, national wilderness areas, na-
tional monuments, national seashores, and other areas of special national or regional natural, 
recreational, scenic, or historic value." 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2). In the 1977 amendments to the Clean 
Air Act, Congress required "aggressive steps [be taken] to remedy existing visual deterioration, 
and to prevent future impairment" of pristine areas where visibility is an important value. Chev-
ron USA, Inc. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Ostrov, Visibility Protection 
Under the Clean Air Act: Preserving Scenic and Parkland Areas in the Southwest, 10 EcoLoGY 
L. Q. 397, 401 (1982). 
98. The Clean Water Act of 1977 is a federal enactment which is designed to improve the 
quality of the nations water. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1985). Through this Act, 
Congress has sought to "prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution" and "to plan the development 
and use of land and water resources." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Therefore, the protection of water 
resources, (and all things which are affected by the preservation of clean water) is an additional 
step which Congress has taken to protect the integrity of national parks. 
99. For example, the NPS can prohibit logging in an area if the logging is occurring close to 
endangered species. 
100. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Court found that an 
endangered species known as the snail darter, was being threatened by the Tellico Dam then 
currently under construction. Though the dam was almost 80o/o completed when the snail darter 
was discovered, the Court found that the 78 million dollars thus far spent in construction, would 
have to give way to a permanent injunction. In thus holding, the Court stated: 
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value of endangered species and scenic preservation,101 statutes like the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and ESA can regulate activities occurring 
beyond the actual situs of national parks. 
C. Controlled Resource Development 
The legislation which allows, yet controls, the development of nat-
ural resources located in or near national parks include: the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act;102 the Multiple-Use Sustained 
Yield Act/03 and the Geothermal Steam Act. 104 These statutes are in-
dicative of some of the recent protective statutes which have been en-
[T]he plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that 
Congress viewed the value of endangered species as "incalculable." Quite obviously, it 
would be difficult for the Court to balance the loss of a sum certain -even $100 mil-
lion-against a congressionally declared "incalculable" value .... 
/d. at 187-88. Therefore, in October 1978, Congress created a new cabinet-level committee to 
resolve irreconcilable conflicts between ESA and federal projects. In January, 1979, the newly 
appointed committee infuriated some members of Congress by ruling that the snail darter did 
indeed outweigh the completion of the Tellico Dam. Congress finally exempted the Tellico Dam 
from ESA in September 1979, and the snail darter's fate hung on the success of a transplantation 
program. G. CoGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW 600 
(1981 ). It can therefore be seen, that ESA is one statute which has been interpreted very strictly. 
I 01. It has been calculated that society would be willing to pay 3.5 billion dollars a year to 
preserve the visibility in Grand Canyon National Park. To protect the visibility in parklands 
located in the southwest, an annual payment of 6.2 billion dollars by society has been calculated. 
Schulze, Brookshire, Walther, MacFarland, Thayer, Whitworth, Ben-David, Maim, Molenar, 
The Economic Benefits of Preserving Visibility in the National Parklands of the Southwest, 23 
NAT. RESOURCES j. 149, 149 (1983). 
102. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 goes beyond any 
previous mining regulation (Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982)) and allows any 
party to petition the Secretary to designate any particular area as unsuitable for surface coal 
mining. 30 U.S.C. §§1201-1328 (Supp. 1985)(emphasis added). See also§ 1272(c)(Supp. 1984). 
SMCRA states that an area may be designated as unsuitable for mining if the mining will "affect 
fragile or historic lands in which such operations could result in significant damage to important 
historic, cultural, scientific and aesthetic values and natural systems." 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(b). 
103. The Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY) of 1960 provides that "it is the 
policy of the Congress that the natural forests are established and shall be administered for the 
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed and wildlife and fish purposes." 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-
531 (1982). The purpose of MUSY is to provide a compromise through which land can be used in 
two or more compatible ways. MUSY protects renewable resources by managing their extraction, 
while MUSY regulates the time necessary for adequate regeneration. MUSY provides additional 
protection to national parks by not allowing too much resources to be taken from national parks 
without adequate time for regeneration. 
I 04. The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 gave the Secretary the right to issue leases for the 
development and production of geothermal steam. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-25 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
Before any serious exploration or development of geothermal steam can begin, an operation plan 
containing a narrative statement describing the proposed measures to be taken for the protection of 
the environment is required. The topics which require attention include "the prevention or con-
trol of (1) fires, (2) soil erosion, (3) pollution of the surface and ground water, (4) damage to fish 
and wildlife or other natural resources,and (5) air and noise pollution." G. COGGINS & C. WIL-
KINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW 451 (1981). 
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acted to allow development of natural resources located in national 
parks. The main thrust of these statutes are to allow development of 
natural resources in such a manner that national parks are not seri-
ously degraded. These statutes provide for extensive reclamation while 
attempting to manage renewable resources in a manner which allows 
adequate time for regeneration. 1011 
Perhaps a good example of a resource development statute is the 
Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act (MUSY). 106 The purpose of 
MUSY is to protect renewable resources from complete extraction 
while allowing time for adequate regeneration. Harvesting trees is one 
example where MUSY applies. Under MUSY, an average range is 
required to lay dormant with no logging allowed for a predetermined 
period of years. 107 Once logging has occurred, the land is left until the 
trees are sufficiently mature before logging is once again permissible. 
D. Summary of Recent Legislative Enactments 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, Congress is constantly pro-
viding more protection to the ever-increasing fragility of national parks' 
ecosystems. Though this is an impressive list of legislative enactments, 
most of these statutes have been enacted or seriously amended in the 
last two decades.108 One problem with this is that these statutes were 
not passed with the intention of being national park bandages. 109 Their 
application is designed to prevent future degradation. Applying these 
statutes in a retroactive fashion will most likely not produce the antici-
pated results. The NPS cannot fulfill the requirements outlined in 
some of these statutes because the degradation has already exceeded the 
105. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(24) (1982), provides that mining and reclamation operations shall 
operate to the extent possible, in a manner which will use the best technology available to mini-
mize disturbances and achieve enhancement of resources. See also In re Surface Mining Regula-
tion Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301, 1313 (D.D.C. 1978) (requiring some of the land to be restored 
to a condition better than before the mining). Also, "Sustained-Yield" of the Multiple-Use and 
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY) means "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity. . of the 
various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the productivity of the 
land" (emphasis added). 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1982). 
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1982). See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
107. Different types of trees have different regeneration periods allotted to them by the For-
est Service. This protects national parks by allowing trees to fully mature before harvesting. Not 
only does this strengthen forests, it also provides protection for the watershed and silverculture. 
The period of time given by the Forest Service for regeneration is generally longer than the time 
allotted by private entities. For example, the rotation period for Douglas Fir is 100 years for the 
Forest Service, while private forest harvest rates vary from 40-60 years. G. CoGGINS & C. WIL-
KINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW 472 (1981). 
108. See supra notes 86-107. 
I 09. Most of these statutes were passed with an eye to the future. The purpose was not to 
repair past occurrences, but rather, to prohibit future occurrences. 
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standards outlined. This is why even more stringent regulations are still 
being proposed. 110 With so many statutes, the question still arises 
whether the Secretary currently has adequate explicit/implicit author-
ity to protect national parks from exterior threats. The Parks Report 
indicates that 4,345 threats currently exist. 111 Because over half of these 
threats originate from outside the national parks, it has been proposed 
that buffer zones be created to deal with exterior threats. The next 
section will address buffer zones and the fifth amendment takings 
clause as a legal obstacle to their creation. 
V. PRoTECTION THROUGH BuFFER ZoNES: A CoNSTITUTIONAL 
TAKING? 
Degradation threatening national parks has put many agencies 
and environmental groups on a bandwagon proclaiming that most pe-
riphery problems can be handled through the creation of buffer 
zones. 112 In the past, the federal government created buffer zones by 
purchasing land surrounding national parks. 113 On February 19, 1981, 
however, Secretary of the Interior James Watt announced that a "mor-
atorium" would be placed on all land acquisition efforts by the NPS. 114 
The NPS could no longer purchase surrounding lands to protect na-
tional parks, rather, the NPS was required to create buffer zones 
through alternative means.w1 The purpose of this section is to consider 
110. See National Park System Protection and Resource Management Act, infra notes 142-
44 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra note 3. 
112. Protecting National Parks, supra note 1. One problem with buffer zones is that prop-
erty is an interdependent network of competing uses. Land does not exist independent of other 
land. Land disregards legal boundaries. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 
YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971). A second problem which government faces is where will the buffer 
zone end' "Does it stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific?" Battle Over the Wilderness, supra 
note 13, at 29. "Congress cannot give the Park Service full police powers outside its boundaries 
without deciding where that power should end .... " Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 265. "To 
a significant extent the problem centers on the existence of adjacent lands, and there will always 
be new lands adjacent to any new boundary." Sax, Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions For The 
National Park Service, 1980 DuKE L.J. 709, 720-21 [hereinafter Buying Scenery]. As was stated 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), "a buffer zone has a bound-
ary as well, and unless that zone is a 'no-man's land' that is off-limits for both neighbors (which 
of course is not the case here) its creation achieves nothing except to shift the location of the 
boundary dispute further on to the private owner's land." /d. at 3149 n.6. Though many agencies 
laud the creation of buffer zones, buffer zones do have their limitations. 
113. "[W)henever the focal points have been threatened by outside activity, the simplest and 
most effective response has been for the government to acquire additional surrounding land as 
insulation." Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1190. 
114. Lambert, Private Landholdings in the National Parks: Examples from Yosemite Na-
tional Park and Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 35, 38-39 
(1982). 
115. For national parks created before 1959, the NPS can only acquire full fee title in land if 
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whether buffer zone regulations can rise to the level of a fifth amend-
ment taking. 
A. Introduction Into the Takings Clause 
The fifth amendment provides that "private land shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation."116 One of the unsolved 
questions of the past two centuries concerning this provision has been: 
what factors are actually necessary to constitute a taking? This ques-
tion is especially troublesome when a "taking" is allegedly caused by 
governmental regulations rather than a physical invasion. 117 In Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 118 the Supreme Court, stated that a regu-
lation can constitute a taking119 if the regulation has "gone too far." 120 
The question which necessarily follows is: when has a regulation "gone 
too far ?"121 
it can be explained why none of the following alternatives are suitable: I) cooperative agreements 
2) tax incentives 3) zoning 4) transfer of development rights 5) easements 6) leases 7) purchase 
and sellhacks or 8) land exchanges. It can therefore be seen that the Secretary cousiders land 
acquisition as no longer being a viable method of national park protection. ld. 
116. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This same provi-
sion is made applicable to states through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. 
See Chicago, Burlington & Qunicy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 ( 1897); Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. !55, 160 (1980). 
117. For many years courts did not recognize a regulation as rising to the level of a taking, 
but this view has changed over time. As Justice Brennan stated in San Diego Gas & Eler. Co. v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, j., dissenting): 
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can 
destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as 
effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the property 
owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or 
whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state . 
ld. at 652. 
118. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
119. lt should be recognized that under the doctrine of eminent domain, government actually 
acquires title to the private owner's property. When government does not acquire title to the land, 
but rather, imposes regulations which interfere with the private enjoyment of the land, this form 
of taking is referred to as "inverse condemnation." Since government never acquires the land in 
fee, inverse condemnation suits are somewhat different than pure takings cases. In Agins v. 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (I 980), the court phrased inverse condemnation as "a shorthand descrip-
tion of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property 
when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." ld. at 258 n.2. 
120. Thus, the actual analysis by the court over the last half century has been an attempt to 
define what factors the court should look at in determining if a regulation has "gone too far." 
Justice Holmes stated: "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 2S5 (1980); Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
121. Though there is no precise criteria, the Court has indicated some of the circumstances 
under which governmental action does not rise to the level of a taking. Two of these factors are: 
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B. Buffer Zone Regulations and Penn Central 
In 1978, the Supreme Court enunciated its most recent test for 
determining whether a taking has occurred. 122 This test, found in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,123 announces a three 
part test which requires a balancing of governmental and private inter-
ests. These interests are: 1) the character of the governmental action/ 24 
2) the extent to which the value of the land has been diminished/211 and 
3) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the invest-
ment-backed expectations of the property owner. 126 
1) it is generally held that a mere diminution in the value of one's land is not enough to constitute 
a taking. As Justice Holmes stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), 
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law." 260 U.S. at 413. See also Kirby 
Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Assn. 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237 
(Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 
(1962); Elucid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915); Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 2) it is not enough that the owner is denied the 
highest and best use of his land. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 & n.7 (1946). 
While no one single factor is dispositive, when both factors are present, the court may find a 
taking to have occurred. See also Comment, Private Property and Environmental Regulatory 
Takings: A Forward Look into Rights and Remedies, as Illustrated by an Excursion into the 
Wild Rivers Act of Kentucky, 73 Kv. L.J. 999, 1010 (1985). 
122. Though this is the most recent test enuciated by the Supreme Court, the standards 
outlined are still developing. This was once again demonstrated by the recent decision of First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). Four times in the 
past decade the Supreme Court has been asked to considered whether a temporary taking is com-
pensable. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson 
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co., v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Four 
times the court has been unable to reach the merits of the case. In First English, the Court finally 
reached the merits of the case and handed down one of the furthest reaching decisions of this era. 
In First English, the Supreme Court held that the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment requires the government to pay interim damages (interim damages are damages which arise 
when land has been temporarily taken. Land owners seek damages for the interim between which 
the regulation is imposed, and the government either invalidates the regulation or agrees that a 
taking has occurred). The just compensation clause has never been read so broadly. Because of this 
broad interpretation of the fifth amendment, buffer zone creation seems even less tenable than ever 
before. The court recognized that the First English holding would "undoubtedly lessen to some 
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corpora-
tions when enacting land-use regulations," but the Court stated that the invalidation of an unduly 
burdensome ordinance may change a "taking" into a "temporary taking," a remedy insufficient to 
meet the demands of the just compensation clause. 107 S. Ct. at 2389. 
123. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
124. !d. at 124. 
125. /d. 
126. !d. at 124-25. Though "investment-backed expectations" appeared to be somewhat am-
biguous at first blush, the Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), stated that 
the Court was actually inquiring whether the regulation was denying the owner the "economically 
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1. The character of the governmental action 
The first prong of the Penn Central test asks, "what character has 
the governmental action assumed ?"127 Governmental action can take 
one of two forms. It can occur as a physical invasion, or a regulation. 128 
Buffer zones are regulations; therefore, the character of the governmen-
tal action can be classified as regulatory in nature. This determination, 
however, does not end the inquiry. The validity of the regulation must 
also be brought into question. 129 
a. Unfair regulations. In the past, when national parks were cre-
ated, Congress protected the focal interest of the parks by acquiring 
more land than was actually necessary. 13° Consequently, there was no 
need for a designated buffer zone. Sufficient land was purchased to act 
as a "built-in" buffer zone. 131 The question is: should buffer zones be 
created any differently today? Though scarcity of land and prohibitive 
costs132 may encourage a change/33 these reasons do not justify Con-
viable use of his land." Id. at 260. 
127. Comment, A New Approach to Regulatory Taking Analysis, I B.Y.U. J. Pus. L. 399, 
405 (1987) [hereinafter Regulatory Taking]. 
128. ld. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Here the 
Court stated, "[m]ore recent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupa-
tion, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of 
property." ld. at 430. 
129. Assuming arguendo, that buffer zones are valid, see infra text and accompanying notes 
152-55, the impact upon private land caused by buffer zone regulations should nevertheless be 
questioned. Since the fifth amendment is "designed to bar government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole," Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (emphasis added), constitutionally 
mandated compensation may be necessary to alleviate the individual hardship caused by the new 
regulations. See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 
(1978); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). 
130. Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1190. For example, Cuyahoga 
Valley National Recreation Area established in 1974 was established to protect numerous sites of 
historical significance. "The legislative history of the Act make it clear that the use of scenic 
easements should be a major part of the land acquisition program for the area." (Emphasis 
added). Comment, Parks, People, and Private Property: The National Parks Service and Emi-
nent Domain, 16 ENVTL. L. 935, 953 (1986). See also 16 U.S.C. § 430oo (1982) (regarding 
acquisition of Antietam Battlefield). 
131. This is demonstrated by Congress' attempt to resolve the Redwood National Park con-
troversy by enacting a statute which would give the Secretary the authority to acquire the land 
necessary to protect the Redwood National Park. The statute in part reads: 
In order to afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to the timber, soil, and 
streams within the boundaries of the park, the Secretary is authorized, by any of the 
means set out in subsections (a) and (c) of this section, to acquire interests in land from, 
and to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements with, the owners of land on the 
periphery of the park and on watersheds tributary to streams within the park . 
16 U.S.C. § 79c(e) (1982). 
132. In a survey sent to national parks superintendents, the question asked was whether 
deferring land acquisition was saving any money? The response (in rough estimates) was that: 
[n]inety percent of the superintendents reported that the lands in question has at least 
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gress' change from its former method of purchasing buffer zone protec-
tion.134 "[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the consti-
tutional way of paying for the change."1311 Congress should not be able 
to reach its same ultimate objective through land regulation which it 
formerly achieved only through land acquisition. If land is going to be 
regulated in such a manner, government should have to compensate for 
it.lS6 
b. Buffer zones and federalism. Buffer zone creation on state land 
Is a federal action which may encroach upon a states' sovereign power. 
If individual states (wherein national parks are located) do not want 
buffer zones, 137 a conflict between state and federal power may arise 
which reflects upon the validity of the governmental action. Though 
buffer zones can be viewed as having worthy objectives, if individual 
doubled in value over the last five years and had at least tripled over the last ten. 
Eighty-five percent estimated that land values had at least quintupled and fifty percent 
said they had risen ten-fold or more over the last ten years. For old parks, values 
reportedly had increased from fifty-to one-hundred-fold since the date of the park's 
establishment; in a few cases (doubtless with some hyperbole) superintendents even 
reported a thousand-fold increase. 
Buying Scenery, supra note 113, at 720-21. 
133. National parks are one of the nations' greatest resources, and should aggressively be 
protected. This is especially imperative in light of the fact that national parks are irreplaceable 
commodities. 
134. The Constitution does not say that private land should not be taken for public use with 
just compensation except when costs are prohibitive, rather, the Constitution provides that private 
lands shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. CoNST. amend V. Former 
Secretary of the Interior James Watt has been quoted as saying: "We need to acquire more park-
land, and I'm hopeful that within the next year or so ... we'll be able to aggressively increase 
the amount of acreage required for national parks and refuges and wetlands. But right now we 
don't have the economic strength in this country [to do so] .... " Therefore, if James Watt 
recognizes that the United States does not have the economic strength to increase national parks, 
then the NPS should have to wait until the United States does have the economic strength to 
acquire the land through proper means. Battle over the Wilderness, supra note 13, at 25. 
135. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
136. "Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can 
destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as 
a formal condemnation or physical invasion of property." San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
137. States may not want buffer zones to be imposed on national parks within their bounda-
ries because it could inhibit the development and progress of the land within the state. 
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states oppose the land use regulations, 138 then the character of the gov-
ernmental action may be improper. 139 
The federal action of creating buffer zones is particularly offensive 
because "[ t]he preservation of the environmental quality ... is a sub-
ject particularly suited to administration by the states. Congress has 
recognized that even where extensive federal environmental legislation 
exists, the primary responsibility for implementing environmental pol-
icy rests with state and local governments."140 Therefore, imposing 
buffer zones upon states, and private land within states, could be an 
improper use of federal power. 
In fact, in 1966 the Department of the Interior was asked whether 
federal zoning could be imposed on land located in an area designated 
as a national park.141 In responding to this question, the Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior stated: 
Since zoning involves a purely local situation, and since it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to justify the Federal zoning power in connection 
with any constitutionally granted power, it is our opinion that in the 
absence of a cession by a State and acceptance by the United States of 
legislative jurisdiction over a specific area authorized for Federal ad-
ministration, the zoning statute suggested in your memorandum 
would be held to be unconstitutional. 142 
According to the Solicitor, zoning private land located within areas des-
ignated as national parks would be an infringement upon a state's 
rights. By analogy, buffer zones which are created outside areas desig-
nated as national parks would similarly be an infringement upon the 
138. Representatives from five western states whose federal land holdings total more than 
fifty percent of the land located within their boundaries are very concerned with the creation of 
buffer zones. The impact that buffer zones might have on a state's development are far reaching. 
For instance, a representative of Utah, noted that if lands adjacent to parks were to be protected 
within a ten-mile radius of the parks, this would essentially "tie up, basically, all of southern and 
eastern Utah." Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1209. (The five states 
which have more than fifty percent of their land occupied by federal land holdings are: Alaska 
90.5'7o, Nevada 87.6%, Utah 65.1%, Idaho 63% and Oregon 52.5%. Note, The Property Power, 
Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 817 n.1 (1980). Other states 
which would be dramatically affected by buffer zones are: Wyoming 48.6%, California 46.1 %, 
Arizona 44.2%, Colorado 35.6%, New Mexico 33.5%, Montana 29.6% and Washington 29.1 %. 
The Property Clause, supra note 68, at 483 ). 
139. Though state opposition to federal statutes may be superceded by the supremacy clause, 
the purpose of this analysis is to question the nature of the governmental action (under Penn 
Central) rather than challenge Congress' power to enact such legislation. 
140. In State ex. rei. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 798, 554 P.2d 969, 976 (1976). See also 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
141. Buffer zones are more egregious than the example here because in this example, the 
private land in question was actually located within the boundaries of a national park. 
142. Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 248. 
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state's rights. Buffer zones should arguably only be created when a 
state has ceded the land to the federal government. 
Congress' overreaching is further demonstrated by the opposition 
which arose against the passage of the National Park System Protection 
and Resources Management Act (Parks Protection Act). 143 When the 
Parks Protection Act was introduced into Congress, one of the strongest 
arguments against its passage144 was that the bill gave the Secretary too 
much power to control the activities located on the periphery of na-
tional parks. Members of the House committee who opposed the bill 
concluded: 
[L]ocal and state governments, who through no fault of their own are 
located adjacent to national parks, should not be asked to sacrifice 
their growth and the economic well-being of their citizens because of 
perceived threats against park resources which emanate from beyond 
the borders of their neighboring parks without an adequate opportu-
nity for input into the identification of, and amelioration of, any such 
perceived problems. HG 
Therefore, if states oppose146 the passage of legislation like the Parks 
Protection Act, then by analogy the validity of the governmental action 
in creating buffer zones must also be questioned. Though states should 
not be completely free to designate which regulations are acceptable 
and which ones are not/47 there is also much controversy over Con-
gress' correct role in regulating federal lands. 148 
143. H.R. 2379, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5162, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). 
External Threat Dilemma, supra note 9, at 357 & n.6. 
144. The bill passed the House by a margin of almost four-to-one, (The vote was 321 "for" 
and 82 "against") but the Senate failed to adopt it. Id. at 357 & n.7. 
145. Development Beyond Their Borders, supra note 36, at 1209. 
146. Though commentators acknowledge that government regulations can in theory produce 
more efficient results, commentators also contend that this is only true in theory and not in prac-
tice. The sheer physical immensity of any effort to regulate land uses beyond the local level ex-
ceeds the capabilities of even the best planners. Beyond this, government may be vulnerable to 
short term political pressures causing land decisions to be nothing more than a series of political 
compromises. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1587 (1978) [herein-
after Zoning]. See also Stroup & Baden, Externality, Property Rights, and the Management of 
our National Forests, 16 J. L. & EcoN. 303, 305 (1973). 
14 7. One way to restrict overreaching of Congressional power is to provide a state veto 
power on any proposed national environmental legislation. Though the validity of such a state veto 
may be challenged under Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
(holding a section of the Immigration and Naturalization Act unconstitutional because it allowed 
either house of Congress to invalidate an executive decision regarding the status of an alien), the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1982), is one example of such a state veto 
provision. Whether the Supreme Court will uphold this type of a provision has not been tested, 
but it has been argued that Chadha would not apply. See Davenport, The Law of High-Level 
Nuclear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REV. 481, 500-01 (1986). 
148. This unrest is demonstrated by the recent "Sagebrush Rebellion." The sagebrush rebel-
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c. The constitutionality of buffer zones. While the Redwood Na-
tional Parks cases were being tried,149 the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB)1110 was asked to evaluate a bill which was drafted to 
give the Secretary power to control activities occurring outside Red-
wood National Park. 1111 As a result of the OMB's evaluation, the bill 
was never submitted to Congress. 1112 The main reason the bill was 
never submitted was that the OMB determined: 
During the interagency review of this legislation, a substantive prob-
lem was identified which is of concern to us. By attempting to extend 
the degree to which the Federal Government can regulate the use of 
private property without creating a compensable taking, the bill 
would provide for a precedential and major expansion of the Property 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution which we believe should not be 
undertaken. us 
Rather than solely relying on the property clause in stating that the 
Redwood legislation would be unconstitutional, the OMB also indi-
cated that the bill "might violate the fifth amendment, which prohibits 
the taking of property without just compensation."1114 Therefore, if the 
OMB believed that exercise of this power by the Secretary over non-
lion was "an aggregation of legislative attempts by the 'western public land states' to wrest owner-
ship of certain lands from the federal government." Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should 
Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505, 505. Some states went so far as to pass 
legislation which claimed to vest ownership of federal lands in the states. Nevada passed such 
legislation which provides that: "[ s ]ubject to existing rights, all public lands in Nevada and all 
minerals not previously appropriated are the property of the State of Nevada and subject to its 
jurisdiction and control." Id. at 512-13. 
149. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
150. The Office of Management and Budget has as one of its responsibilities the duty of 
reviewing all proposed Department legislation. 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), Exec. Order No. 11,541,3 
C.F.R. 141 (1970). 
151. Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 248-49. 
152. The bill in part provided: 
The Secretary of the Interior is further authorized to identify and establish zones 
outside the boundary of Redwood National Park but within watersheds ... [and] shall 
promulgate and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations, including reasonable 
restrictions on harvesting of timber, within such zones as are necessary to provide con-
tinuing protection to the lands and other resources within the park. Provided, however, 
that nothing in this provision shall be considered as authority to acquire lands or inter-
ests in lands within such zones through the adoption of such rules and regulations; and, 
provided further, that any regulation adopted by the Secretary that is deemed by a 
court of competent jurisdiction to require the taking of a property interest compensable 
under Article 5 of the Constitution of the United States shall have no effect. 
ld. at 248-49 n.56. 
153. Id. at 249. 
154. /d. at 249-50. The proposed bill stated that if a court found that the regulation had 
constituted a taking, then the regulation was to be deemed "of no effect." See supra note 152. 
Therefore, it would appear that the bill itself recognized that the creation of zones could constitute 
a taking for which compensation would be due. 
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federal lands next to the Redwood National Park could result in a tak-
ing, then by analogy, creating buffer zones which effectuate the same 
result could also constitute a taking. 11111 
2. Diminution in value 
The second prong of the Penn Central test requires an analysis of 
the diminution in value of the land affected by buffer zones. 1116 As was 
previously mentioned, a mere diminution in value (in most cases) will 
not constitute a taking. 1117 Hadacheck v. Sebastian/ 118 has long stood for 
this proposition. In Hadacheck, the Court upheld an ordinance which 
required a property owner to close his brickyard even though the dimi-
nution in value was from $800,000 to $60,000. 1119 Though today's 
courts may still tolerate a certain amount of diminution in value before 
adjudging that a taking has occurred/80 courts will most likely not al-
low a diminution in value as great as Hadacheck simply for the crea-
tion of buffer zones. 181 
The reason why courts will not allow such a diminution in value 
is that the legislative objectives in creating buffer zones are arguably 
less significant than the ultimate objectives sought in Hadacheck. 162 In 
Hadacheck, the Court upheld the state ordinance on the ground that it 
was for the health, safety and welfare of the people. 183 The ordinance 
was considered a valid exercise of state police powers. Buffer zone reg-
ulation, by contrast, does not protect the health, safety and welfare of 
155. Because the OMB is an administrative agency its opinions have limited application to 
legislative and judicial determinations. The importance of this response by the OMB is that it 
affected the ultimate submission of the bill. Arguably its analysis must have some validity. 
156. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
157. See supra note 121. 
158. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See also Elucid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 
Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
159. 239 U.S. at 405. It should be noted, that this diminution in value was an allegation, not 
a finding of fact. Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987). 
160. "While virtually all physical invasions are deemed takings, (citations omitted) a regula-
tory program that adversely affects property values does not constitute a taking unless it destroys a 
major portion of the property's value." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Ange-
les, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2393 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 (1985). 
161. The creation of buffer zones will cause a great diminution in value. As stated in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), "this is not a case in which Government is exercising 
its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' pri-
vate property." ld. at 180. Consequently, like in Kaiser Aetna, government will have to compen-
sate the parties which have been substantially damaged. 
162. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
163. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). This case can also be analyzed under the doctrine of public nui-
sance. The court upheld the validity of the ordinance because of the public nuisance present. 
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the people/64 but rather, buffer zones are designed to preserve wildlife 
and aesthetic beauty. 1611 Thus it is questionable whether the Court's 
impetus in Hadacheck would similarly apply to buffer zones. 
Beyond this, a second reason why courts will not allow such a 
diminution in value is that land subject to such environmental restric-
tions may be worth very little relative to its value if available for devel-
opment. "Traditional analysis suggests that the large diminution in 
value resulting from such restrictive regulations would by itself indicate 
a taking."166 The diminution in value caused by buffer zone creation is 
great, because in order to provide the protection needed, buffer zones 
must enforce stringent regulations requiring a substantial reduction in 
land value.167 Arguably, the impact upon land value caused by buffer 
zones should be enough to meet the diminution in value prong of the 
Penn Central test. 
3. Investment-backed expectations 
The third prong of the Penn Central test requires an analysis of 
the extent to which a regulation has interfered with the investment-
backed expectations of a property owner. 168 One problem with the in-
vestment-backed expectation prong is that the Court has failed to define 
what "investment-backed expectations" really are. One year after Penn 
Central, the Court attempted to elucidate the third prong by adding 
that a taking can occur when a regulation deprives an owner of the 
164. A state government, as far as the Constitution is concerned, holds police powers to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of its residents. By contrast, federal powers must be found 
within one of the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Analysis of Article 
I, Section 8 leads to the conclusion that there is no federal power to act for the general welfare of 
the people. Therefore, Congress has only implied police powers whereby they can act for the 
welfare of the people. ]. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA & ]. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 121 (2d 
ed. 1983). 
165. The problem that Congress faces in creating buffer zones is that the imposition of the 
regulations necessary to create buffer zones is beyond Congress' powers. See supra note 166. Also, 
wildlife, natural resources, and aesthetic beauty are items considered less legitimate than the regu-
lation of public health. Davis, The National Trails System Act And The Use Of Protective Fed-
eral Zoning, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 251 (1986). 
166. Zoning, supra note 146, at 1620. 
167. Though a diminution in value may be acceptable to some extent, there must also be 
limitations placed on how far the land use can be regulated. For example, the Park Service should 
not be able to prohibit agricultural landowners from using pesticides that are generally used on 
agricultural lands elsewhere. Nor should it prevent private owners from using conventional fire-
fighting techniques, even where the Service has decided the best strategy is to let the fire burn 
itself out. Also, "if farming were prohibited in order to preserve the land's wild appearance . 
acquisition with compensation would probably be necessary." Helpless Giants, supra note 8, at 
270-71. 
168. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-125 (1978). 
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"economically viable use of his land."189 This new interpretation, how-
ever, has not proved to be any more helpful. 170 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, some state 
courts have grappled with the test. In Commonwealth v. Stearns Coal 
& Lumber Co.,171 the Supreme Court of Kentucky indicated in dicta 
that a land owner's investment-backed expectations could have been vi-
olated if a regulation which prohibited mining and the clear-cutting of 
timber had been fully implemented. 172 Therefore, if prohibiting mining 
and the clear-cutting of timber could satisfy the investment-backed ex-
pectation prong in Kentucky (arguably), then any buffer zone regula-
tion prohibiting this level of activity could also arguably satisfy the in-
vestment-backed expectation prong.173 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
With the current reading of the fifth amendment takings clause, 
buffer zone regulations adjacent to national parks will most likely con-
stitute a compensable regulatory taking. As Congress continues to pro-
pose new legislation for national park protection, Congress should seri-
ously consider the propriety and the effectiveness of such legislation. 
Though the scope of the property clause appears to have expanded over 
the last few decades, creating land use regulations without providing 
just compensation appears to have contracted. 
Whatever the fate, the creation of buffer zones without just com-
pensation forces "some people alone to bear public burden[ s] which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."174 
"[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough 
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change."175 Buffer zone regulations must there-
169. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
170. Regulatory Taking, supra note 127, at 407. 
171. 678 S.W.2d 378 (1984). 
172. /d. at 381. The regulation which imposed this restriction was the Kentucky Wild Rivers 
Act. The Wild Rivers Act had been fully implemented in Kentucky. The court indicated that a 
taking would have occurred because "[t)he land had to remain practically untouched and in a 
primitive natural state." !d. 
173. The "investment-backed expectations" test appears to focus on future losses rather than 
immediate diminution. In this manner it is able to distinguish itself from the second prong of the 
Penn Central test. "The Court noted that no 'set formula' existed to determine, in all cases, 
whether compensation is constitutionally due for a government restriction of property. Ordinarily, 
the Court must engage in 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.'" Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
174. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, I 07 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 
(1987) (citations omitted). 
175. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
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fore be carefully evaluated to determine whether national park protec-
tion outweighs individual property rights. 
Daniel]. Anderson 
